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MINORITY ADMISSIONS TO LAW SCHOOL:  
MORE TROUBLE AHEAD, AND TWO 
SOLUTIONS 
JEFFREY EVANS STAKE† 
INTRODUCTION 
For decades, the Law School Admission Test (“LSAT”) has 
played a key role in the admissions process at many law schools.  
Pressures from the rankings published by U.S. News and World 
Report (“USNAWR”) have increased its importance in recent 
years, to the point that many schools admit most applicants that 
have LSAT scores above the school median.  The emphasis on 
LSAT in admissions has narrowed the range of LSATs at many 
schools.  This stratification could have negative effects on the law 
school experience for students and may have already decreased 
the number of minority students admitted. 
The future looks worse.  Now that schools have nearly 
maximized their LSATs for a good portion of the class, they will 
turn their attentions to the undergraduate grade point average 
(“UGPA”).  If schools maximize both the UGPA and the LSAT, 
there will be fewer minorities, and especially fewer blacks, at the 
law schools ranked in the top half of the USNAWR rankings.  
 
† Jeffrey Evans Stake, Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-
Bloomington; B.A. from University of Illinois in 1975; J.D. from Georgetown 
University Law Center in 1981; recent Chair of the Indiana Law Admissions 
Committee for half a decade; co-host (with William Henderson) of the conference on 
The Next Generation of Law School Rankings at Indiana University in the Spring of 
2005. I give special thanks to Kenneth Dau-Schmidt and Kaushik Mukhopadhaya 
for running regressions for me, to Dennis Long for finding data, and to Thomas M. 
Hogan, Executive Articles Editor of St. John’s Law Review, for patience. 
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This Article predicts that minority representation in law schools 
will diminish unless something is done to reverse the forces 
currently in play.  A partial solution to this admissions problem 
would be for USNAWR to shift its formula from relying on the 
UGPA and LSAT medians to the 75th percentiles.  A better 
solution would be for the Law School Admission Council 
(“LSAC”) to construct, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) to 
collect, and USNAWR to incorporate an index made from the 
UGPA and LSAT rather than using the two criteria separately. 
I.  WHY DO LAW SCHOOLS USE THE LSAT? 
The ABA standards for accrediting law schools state that “[a] 
law school shall require each applicant to take a valid and 
reliable admission test to assist the school in assessing the 
applicant’s capability of satisfactorily completing the school’s 
educational program.”1  Because there is no other test that has 
been taken by all law applicants and because no law school wants 
to reduce its pool of applicants by requiring them to take an 
additional test, schools have used, and will continue to use, the 
LSAT as this common denominator. 
However, there is more to be said for the LSAT than that.  
The LSAT has been designed to give law schools a relatively 
inexpensive means of sorting students according to their ability 
to perform in law school.  This goal of predicting law school 
performance is something of a moving target because a student’s 
performance in law school depends in part on what courses she 
takes.  Some courses are graded by easy graders, some by 
teachers with old-fashioned standards, some with narrow ranges, 
and some on a broader scale.2  Students who would perform the 
same if they took the same classes may perform differently in the 
actual courses they take.  This makes it hard to validate the 
LSAT by reference to law school grades.  However, and very 
conveniently for the designers of the test, most law schools 
require all first year students to take the same core courses and 
allow students few, if any, options during that initial year.  
 
1 American Bar Association, Standards for Accreditation of Law Schools, 
Standard 503, Admission Test, available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/ 
standards/chapter5.html. 
2 See generally Jeffrey Evans Stake, Making the Grade: Some Principles of 
Comparative Grading, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 583 (2002) (discussing the unfairness and 
inefficiency that arise when teachers grade with different scales). 
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Because the first year curriculum is also very similar across law 
schools, first year performance should not vary as much across 
law schools as it would if second or third year performance were 
used.  For these reasons, the LSAT is often validated against first 
year grades. 
The LSAT does a decent job of predicting first year grades. 
In her study published in 2000, Linda Wightman found that the 
validity coefficient ranged from about .20 to .65 across schools,3 
and the median was .40 for all schools.4  This correlation will 
likely decline as the range of LSATs at each school becomes 
increasingly restricted.  Nevertheless, it is a useful predictor of 
something a school might rationally care about at the time of 
admission:  how a student will perform in her first year as 
measured by her grades. 
Of course, most of the first year performance is assessed with 
written examinations, so the usual validation does not indicate 
whether the LSAT predicts other performance such as oral 
argumentation, which does not receive much, if any, weight in 
the first year grades of law students.  Indeed, many of the skills 
that are important to effective lawyering are not measured by 
written exams and are therefore not reflected in first year 
grades.  Lawyers, faculty, students, judges, and clients have 
identified twenty-six factors that are important for effective 
lawyering.5  The list includes many qualities that are connected 
to what one would want in a lawyer in one’s firm or as one’s 
counsel:  practical judgment, creativity and innovation, passion 
and engagement, ability to see the world through the eyes of 
others, networking and business development, diligence, 
integrity, and honesty.6  Few first year courses are graded with 
systems that include measures of these skills and abilities. 
Because first year assessments do not attempt to measure 
the full panoply of qualities needed for lawyering and because 
the LSAT is even more narrow in what it measures, the LSAT 
should not be taken as a predictor of lawyering ability or 
 
3 LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, BEYOND FYA: 
ANALYSIS OF THE UTILITY OF LSAT SCORES AND UGPA FOR PREDICTING ACADEMIC 
SUCCESS IN LAW SCHOOL 16–17 (2000). 
4 Id. at 16. 
5 Marjorie M. Shultz, Expanding the Definition of Merit, BOALT HALL 
TRANSCRIPT, Summer 2005, at 26. 
6 Linley Erin Hall, What Makes for Good Lawyering?, BOALT HALL TRANSCRIPT, 
Summer 2005, at 24. 
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performance.  It is true that many of the skills that are 
important on the LSAT are also important in lawyering, from the 
ability to concentrate for a few hours without a break, to the 
ability to read English, to the ability to engage in some forms of 
logical deduction and induction.  But there are so many other 
skills that are important to lawyering that one cannot predict 
with any confidence either that a person who scored poorly on the 
LSAT will become an unsuccessful lawyer or that a person who 
scored well on the LSAT will become a successful lawyer. 
The correlation between the LSAT and first year grades is 
higher than the correlation between undergraduate grade point 
average and first year grades (.25).7  When the two are combined 
in a formula optimized for each school, the LSAT and UGPA 
together make a better predictor than either alone, with a 
correlation of .48 to first year grades.8  The combination is a good 
predictor for both white and minority students, although it 
slightly under-predicts grades of white students and slightly 
over-predicts the grades of minority students. 9 
The LSAT score correlates, though less well, with other 
numbers a school might care about.  Possibly due in part to the 
similarity of the examination formats, the LSAT correlates to bar 
passage.  It also correlates to earnings in practice after entrance 
to the bar, at least for graduates from one prestigious law school.  
Using data from the University of Michigan Law School survey of 
its graduates,10 a regression of income on a number of factors 
suggests that each point on the LSAT is worth about $500 per 
year in income five years after law school, when other factors are 
held equal.11  That effect is not sustained over the long term, 
however.  By fifteen years after graduation, it has disappeared.  
The same data set also suggests that graduates with higher 
 
7 See WIGHTMAN, supra note 3, at 16. 
8 See id. 
9 LISA C. ANTHONY AND MEI LIU, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, ANALYSIS 
OF DIFFERENTIAL PREDICTION OF LAW  SCHOOL PERFORMANCE BY RACIAL/ETHNIC 
SUBGROUPS BASED ON THE 1996-1998 ENTERING LAW SCHOOL CLASSES 14 (2003). 
10 The regressions were run by Kaushik Mukhopadhaya on the Michigan Law 
Alumni data set, survey years 1995-2000, provided by Kenneth Dau-Schmidt. 
11 The independent variables for that regression included: years of work, yearly 
hours of work, yearly hours of work squared, undergraduate GPA, LSAT, city size 
(small, medium, large), region (east, southeast, west, west coast, midwest), and type 
of practice (private (small, medium, large, super-large), corporate counsel, 
government, legal services, other practice, public officer, teaching, judging, non-
practice (business, government, other)). 
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LSATs seem to be slightly less satisfied with their jobs both 5 
years and 15 years after graduation.  This effect was significant, 
but not large. 
Although the LSAT is limited in what it predicts, and its 
limitations ought to be borne in mind when it is used to sort 
students,12 it is reasonable for a law school to conclude that an 
LSAT score does contain information that could be useful to 
those charged by the law school with offering admission to 
applicants. 
II.  WHY DOES USNAWR USE THE LSAT? 
In order to make its rankings, USNAWR appears to have 
decided that it needs numbers, and the student LSAT scores are 
numbers that are available for nearly all law schools.  USNAWR 
does not use all of the LSAT scores of all of the students in a 
school, which would be costly because they are not publicly 
available.  Instead, for purposes of comparing schools, USNAWR 
uses the median LSAT from each school as one of its indicators of 
the quality of the school, with higher medians indicating better 
schools.13 
One reason for USNAWR to use the LSAT as a criterion is 
that better students might make a school a better place of 
learning for other students.  Notice, however, that the connection 
between the LSAT and what USNAWR wants to measure is less 
direct than the connection between the LSAT and what a law 
school wants to measure.  A law school wants to find students 
who will do well in law school.  USNAWR is trying to provide 
consumer information to potential students.14  Toward that end, 
 
12 Professor William Henderson has found that the LSAT predicts performance 
on time-pressured exams better than it predicts performance on other forms of 
assessment. See William D. Henderson, The LSAT, Law School Exams, and 
Meritocracy: The Surprising and Undertheorized Role of Test-Taking Speed, 82 TEX. 
L. REV. 975, 1031–34 (2004). 
13 For the ranking that it published in April 2006, USNAWR used what it called 
the calculated LSAT median, which was the average of the 75th percentile and the 
25th percentile for each school. America’s Best Graduate Schools 2006: Law 
Methodology, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/grad/ 
rankings/about/06law_meth_brief.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). If the distribution 
of students at a school were normal, the median and calculated median would be the 
same. With a non-normal distribution, however, it is possible for a school to have a 
lower calculated median than its actual median. A school could also have a higher 
calculated median, but that would be unusual. 
14 There are others who read the law school rankings, but it is doubtful that 
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it wants to know how schools vary in the quality of educational 
experience they offer to students.  Surely the students in a school 
make up a part of the experience of their classmates.  But it is 
not necessarily the case that a school that has students with 
higher LSATs is a better product for a given buyer than a school 
that has students with lower LSATs.  Indeed, classmates with 
high LSATs might make the law school experience less fruitful 
for a student. LSATs predict first year grades.  But first year 
grades are given on a similar scale, essentially from C to A, at 
many schools.  Therefore, it may well be the case that a student 
who can achieve only a B average at a school that has students 
with high LSATs could achieve an A- average at a school with 
substantially lower LSATs.  The fact that many schools offer 
automatic law journal membership and other opportunities to 
those in the top of the class is a corollary reason a student might 
prefer that his competitors be predicted to have slightly lower 
test performance than he will have.  Moreover, employers pay 
attention to class standing, so when it comes time to interview 
for jobs it certainly would be better to stand higher in one’s class, 
which is easier to do when the grades of one’s peers are not so 
high. 
I do not mean to suggest that there is nothing to be gained 
from going to a school in which the other students have high 
LSATs.  Part of what the school offers is exposure to other bright 
students, and it is possible, although not proved, that the 
brighter they are, the better the learning experience.15  The point 
is only that there are costs and there are benefits, and it is not at 
all clear that USNAWR is correct in its implicit assumption that, 
all else equal, any rational applicant would consider a school 
with a higher median LSAT to be better for him than a school 
with a lower median LSAT. 
There is another theory on which USNAWR might include 
the LSAT (and UGPA) medians in its formula.  If schools want 
students with higher LSATs, which they generally do, then 
applicants with high LSATs will have more options than 
students with lower LSATs.  If those students with more options 
 
there are enough of them to financially justify publishing the magazine. As can be 
seen from the text of the articles in the rankings issues, USNAWR considers the 
primary audience to be prospective law students. 
15 Clearly there must be a limit. No parent of a normal four-year-old child would 
put her child in a college classics course to learn how to read. 
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tend to pick a school, they must view that school as being better 
in some way than the schools not chosen.  The higher the 
reputation of a school among applicants, the more picky it can be 
in admissions.  Thus, competition on the criterion of LSAT 
medians is a form of popularity contest in which the judges vote 
with both their feet and their dollars.  Although there are many 
factors that should and do go into individual selections of law 
schools, many of those factors will wash out over large numbers 
of matriculants, and the LSAT medians could rationally be 
viewed as a measure of the reputations of the schools among 
applicants.  Put another way, students’ matriculation decisions 
determine a winner among many shadow (and actual) head-to-
head contests.  Because students know that law school 
admissions are driven heavily by LSAT and UGPA numbers, a 
decision to attend a school is effectively a decision not to attend 
nearly all schools with lower medians on both the LSAT and 
UGPA.  We can consider all of these contests to be part of a 
tournament, and use them to determine the order of placement 
in the tournament.16 
There is a problem with this theory.  The system is biased, 
and the bias stems from USNAWR itself.  Those voting in this 
poll are not particularly well informed.  They are not experts in 
legal education, nor are they experts in evaluating educational 
curricula.  Any admissions officer can tell you that prospective 
students pay far too much attention to factors such as the names 
of courses and programs offered, perhaps because they have so 
little information on the actual quality of the programs.  Many of 
these purchasers recognize that they are poorly informed and 
search for information.17  That search makes them susceptible to 
influence by those with apparent authority. 
By its publication, USNAWR influences these voters.  At law 
 
16 For advocacy of a tournament system for ranking schools, see Christopher 
Avery, Mark Glickman, Caroline Hoxby & Andrew Metrick, A Revealed Preference 
Ranking of U.S. Colleges and Universities 1–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 10803, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/W10803; 
Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test?, 81 Ind. L. J. 25 (2006). 
Their proposal is different in that they would consider only those contests in which a 
student has been accepted to both schools, but the outcome might be similar to a 
tournament based on shadow contests. 
17 One could say that for USNAWR to use the final opinions of last year’s ill-
informed matriculants to inform this year’s ill-informed applicants seems not to 
have offered them much. But that would ignore the information that those 
matriculants gathered in the course of making their decisions. 
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school admissions fairs, for example, many applicants glance at 
their copy of USNAWR before walking over to any school’s table.  
That this is so is no surprise; they bought the magazine on the 
presumption that it would offer information that might influence 
their choices.  Over time, the influence of USNAWR builds up 
within the LSAT medians, so that the medians are less a 
measure of the students’ independent views and more a reflection 
back to USNAWR of its own rankings.  The student opinions echo 
the USNAWR opinions.18 
The contention here is that the LSAT scores reported by 
USNAWR have been influenced by the rankings published by 
USNAWR.  Put more precisely, the change in a school’s LSAT 
rank from one year to the next has been a function of the 
difference between the LSAT rank and the school’s USNAWR 
rank in the earlier year.  For example, if a school was 30th 
according to student opinion as reflected in by LSAT statistics 
and 20th in USNAWR’s omnibus ranking, we would expect the 
students in the following year to modify their opinions upward, 
improving the LSAT rank of the school in the following year.  In 
other words, we would expect to see the LSAT rank increase 
somewhat in the following year. 
To see whether this historical guess is true, I regressed the 
change in LSAT rank from one year to the next on the difference 
between the LSAT rank and the USNAWR rank in the earlier 
year. 19  The regression equation is as follows: 
 
)(101 TTTT USNAWRrankLSATrankLSATrankLSATrank −+=− + ββ
 
Since USNAWR publishes both 25th and 75th percentile 
(“P25” and “P75”) for each school, separate regression equations 
were estimated for each.  In both cases there were 359 
observations, and the results were consistent with the 
hypothesis.  For P75, the coefficient was .260, and for P25 the 
 
18 The rankings in USNAWR are based upon a lot of facts, but that does not 
make the rankings facts. The rankings depend on the criteria chosen for inclusion in 
the formula and the weights given to those criteria. It is these choices that make the 
rankings opinions. Given the problems with the USNAWR criteria, see Jeffrey 
Evans Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, and 
Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 81 IND. L.J. 229, 244–60 (2006), and 
USNAWR’s failure to provide any justification for its weights, whether the 
USNAWR opinions are expert opinions is open to debate. 
19 For the median LSAT and adjusted r-squared values, see id. at appendix. 
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coefficient was .106, both of which are significant at better than 
the .001 level.  There is an echo effect; in the spring USNAWR 
publishes its ranking and in the fall the students echo those 
opinions when they choose their schools.20  Then those new 
opinions feed back into the next USNAWR ranking. 
Because of the echo effect, this circular feedback from 
USNAWR to LSAT statistics and back to USNAWR and so forth, 
the LSAT statistics cannot be taken as reliable, independent 
evidence of the quality of the law schools.  Therefore, the use of 
the LSAT by USNAWR in its rankings lacks a solid justification.  
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that USNAWR will discontinue 
the use of that factor, or even give it less weight than the 12.5 
percent it now accords the LSAT. 
III.  WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF USNAWR’S USE OF THE 
LSAT? 
As explained above, law schools use the LSAT in admissions 
decisions for defensible reasons.  However, many law schools 
place more emphasis on the LSAT than the admissions 
professionals and law school faculties consider appropriate.  Law 
schools have increased the weight given the LSAT not because 
the LSAT is a better indicator than it used to be, but rather 
because the LSAT statistic is one of the few numbers in the 
USNAWR formula over which they have any control.  It is hard 
for a dean to increase the reputation of the school among 
academics or lawyers, although the increase in glossy brochures 
shows deans are attempting to do so.  It is expensive for schools 
to increase the faculty/student ratio, although schools have been 
known to prevent faculty from taking leave in the fall when the 
faculty were counted.  And, for many schools, there is nothing 
more they can do to raise money and thereby increase their 
faculty resources factor.  Because other criteria are beyond 
control, schools focus on the numbers they can improve, and 
three of those in the past were the LSAT 25th, 50th, and 75th 
percentiles. 
Any schools that had failed to focus on the LSAT by 1998 
were prompted to give it more weight by a report commissioned 
by the Association of American Law Schools (“AALS”).  The 
report, by Stephen P. Klein and Laura Hamilton, found that the 
 
20 See id. at 250–55 (discussing the echo effect). 
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LSAT explained most of the variance in the rankings.21  It stated: 
[A]bout 90% of the overall differences in ranks among schools 
can be explained solely by the median LSAT score of their 
entering classes and essentially all of the differences can be 
explained by the combination of LSAT and Academic reputation 
ratings.  Consequently, all of the other 10 factors US News 
measures (such as placement of graduates) have virtually no 
effect on the overall ranks and because of measurement 
problems, what little influence they do have may lead to 
reducing rather than increasing the validity of the results.22 
By raising their LSAT numbers, the schools hope to increase 
their ranks or at least reduce the chances of slipping in the 
rankings due to lower funding from alumni and lower prestige in 
the eyes of faculty, lawyers, and applicants to law schools.23  In 
short, for reasons of self preservation, law schools have 
responded to USNAWR’s questionable use of the LSAT by 
increasing the weight they give the LSAT beyond that which they 
would view as appropriate purely from the point of view of 
admitting the best classes of students. 
As law schools have increased the importance they attach to 
the LSAT, their LSAT statistics have risen, as could easily have 
been predicted.  After the publication of the Klein and Hamilton 
report, the P75s rose approximately .22 LSAT points per year per 
school over the course of six years.24  This is somewhat surprising 
because one might have thought that even before the report was 
published, few schools would have denied admission to very 
many students with LSAT scores above the P75 for their school.25  
 
21 See STEPHEN P. KLEIN & LAURA HAMILTON, ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., THE 
VALIDITY OF THE U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT RANKING OF ABA LAW SCHOOLS 
(1998). 
22 Id. 
23 See Stake, supra note 18 (discussing the echo effect seen in school reputations 
among faculty, lawyers, and applicants). 
24 See Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 
12, 2004, at 69; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Apr. 14, 2003, at 70; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Apr. 15, 2002, at 64; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Apr. 9, 2001, at 78; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP., Apr. 10, 2000, at 73; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 29, 1999, at 94. 
25 Perhaps the students’ decisions also played a role in this increase in the P75s. 
For example, schools ranked higher by USNAWR might see an increase in their 
applications from students with high LSATs. Even without changing the pool of 
students admitted to law school, it is possible to change the sorting of the students 
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In addition to the change in law school admissions criteria, one 
other factor has played a role in this increase.  For much of the 
past decade, most law schools have experienced a large increase 
in the number of applications, and the actual number of 
underlying applicants has also risen.  As the pool swelled, schools 
could become pickier and still fill their classrooms.  Beyond sheer 
numbers, it is also possible that law has attracted higher quality 
applicants to law schools, or at least students who have on 
average more bubble ability and ability to get high grades than 
those who applied in the past. 
One might have expected to see no increase in the P25s since 
the P25 played no part in the USNAWR rankings before 2005.  
However, since USNAWR did publish the P25s, some schools 
might have thought that it was an important number.  Moreover, 
the median LSAT was important, and attempts to increase the 
median could have the effect of also increasing the P25.  And, 
once again, the increase in the pool allowed schools to be 
choosier.  Whatever the reasons, P25s increased in the six years 
after the publication of the Klein and Hamilton report, rising on 
average .467 LSAT points per school, which is significant at the 
.001 level and is, therefore, not likely due to chance.26 
The P25, median (P50), and P75 divide the class into four 
equal portions.  We might call the two middle portions, lying 
between P25 and P75, the midrange of the class.  Half of the 
students fall in this midrange.  Not only are the P25s and P75s 
rising, but there is another, slightly more subtle and perhaps 
more troubling, effect as well.  Since the P25s have moved up 
faster than the P75s, the gap has narrowed and the difference 
between the two has decreased.  Thus, the midrange of the class 
has narrowed. 
A few schools serve as examples of this trend that has 
occurred between the publications of the USNAWR rankings in 
1998 and 2005.  At the start of this period, the University of 
 
among schools in a way that changes the average P75. 
26 See Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 
11, 2005, at 72; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Apr. 12, 2004, at 69; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Apr. 14, 2003, at 70; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Apr. 15, 2002, at 64; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 9, 2001, at 78; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 10, 2000, at 73; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of 
Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 29, 1999, at 94. 
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Southern California Law School’s P75 was 166 and its P25 was 
159.27  The difference between the two, the width of the midrange 
of the USC class, was seven LSAT points.  At the end of the 
period in 2005 USC’s P75 was 167 and its P25 was 163.28  The 
difference between the two at the end of the period was four.  
Thus, the midrange had narrowed by three points out of seven 
over those years.  In 1998, the University of Memphis School of 
Law had a P75 of 160 and a P25 of 147, for a midrange that was 
thirteen LSAT points wide.29  By 2005, the P75 was 158 and the 
P25 was 154, making a midrange of only four.30  The midrange 
had narrowed by nine points.  In 1998, Vanderbilt University 
Law School had a midrange stretching from 165 to 158, for a 
width of seven.31  By 2005, that midrange had shrunk to a width 
of two LSAT points, from 166 to 164.32 
The shrinking midrange can also be seen with a regression.  
When the difference between the P75 and P25 at each school is 
regressed on time, the coefficient on the year is -.247, which is 
significant at better than the .001 level.33  Thus, it appears that 
the midrange is shrinking by nearly one-quarter of an LSAT 
point per year per school across all schools for which data are 
reported by USNAWR.  It does not appear that the trend is 
waning.  The shrinkage was essentially the same [.270, p<.08] for 
the recent change from year 2003 to year 2004.34  There is still 
room for further shrinkage, although it must stop at some point 
since it is impossible for the P25 to exceed the P75.  The average 
 
27 Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 2, 
1998, at 77. 
28 Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 11, 
2005, at 72. 
29 Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, supra note 27. 
30 Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, supra note 28. 
31 Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, supra note 27. 
32 Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, supra note 28. 
33 See Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 
11, 2005, at 72; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Apr. 12, 2004, at 69; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Apr. 14, 2003, at 70; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Apr. 15, 2002, at 64; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 9, 2001, at 78; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 10, 2000, at 73; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of 
Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 29, 1999, at 94; Best Graduate Schools: 
Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 2, 1998, at 77. 
34 See Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 
12, 2004, at 69; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Apr. 14, 2003, at 70. 
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width of the midrange in 2004 was 5.4, down from 6.8 in 1998.35 
This trend could be troubling for those concerned with the 
interests of minority students.  The LSAT scores of black and 
Hispanic students are lower than the LSAT scores of white 
students.  Unless it is possible to attract a greater number of 
minority students with high LSATs, the minority students’ scores 
are going to be more noticeably lower than their class averages 
than they are now.  For example, if the P25 at a school is 152, the 
LSAT scores of the minority students might fit in with a 
substantial number of majority students in the class.  If the P25 
rises substantially and minority students’ LSATs do not rise 
commensurately, the minority students will become statistical 
outliers and will have scores that appear to be importantly 
different from the rest of the class. 
This narrowing of the midrange and concomitant creation of 
minority outliers will continue unless schools decide to ignore the 
consequences of admission decisions and deemphasize the LSAT, 
putting it back in its proper place.  Unfortunately, few schools 
are going to be willing to sacrifice their rank to do the right thing 
in admissions, so the trend is unlikely to stop. 
This raises questions for which answers do not come easily.  
First, what will be the political fallout?  Students, faculty 
members, and others who do not like affirmative action for any 
racial minorities or diversity for diversity’s sake may have an 
easier time making political hay if the minority LSAT scores 
become more separated from the group. 
Second, what will be the cultural fallout within law schools?  
It is possible that the cultural dynamics of a law school will 
change if the minority students have substantially lower LSAT 
scores than almost all of the non-minority students.  It is further 
possible that white students, upon learning of these statistical 
differences, will develop harmful prejudices and characterize 
minority students with negative stereotypes.  It is also possible 
that a growing gap separating minority students’ scores from the 
midrange will change the way minority students perceive 
themselves, making them more self-conscious and reducing their 
willingness to express themselves in front of the rest of the class. 
Third, and closely related, what will be the educational 
 
35 See Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 
12, 2004, at 69; Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Mar. 2, 1998, at 77. 
CP_STAKE 3/23/2006  10:27:10 PM 
314 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:301   
fallout?  It might not help students to think that they are at the 
bottom of the class.  As the midrange narrows, those students 
that are substantially below the midrange might think that the 
expectations of them are lower because their numerical 
predictors are lower, and when students perceive, correctly or 
not, lower expectations for themselves, they may live down to 
those perceived expectations.  In addition, classroom dynamics 
could change if teachers change their teaching to fit a higher and 
narrower midrange on the LSAT.  If a teacher generally teaches 
to some subset of the seventy-five percent of the class above P25, 
and that subset becomes substantially different from the 
students below P25, the classroom behavior and learning of 
minority students may be affected.  And, of lesser importance but 
still a concern, a change in teaching might reduce the chances 
that minority students will pass the bar exam. 
Fourth, what will be the litigation fallout?  Even if the 
culture in law schools and the education they offer is not affected, 
the law might be.  The Supreme Court sent a warning in Grutter 
v. Bollinger that diversity preferences might not be allowed in 
the future.36  Expanding the LSAT gap between white applicants 
and black or Hispanic applicants will make affirmative action 
more stark and thereby increase the chances the Court will find 
affirmative action impermissible.  As the overlap between the 
two groups decreases, the admissions process takes on the 
appearance, as a matter of statistics, of a two-track system, even 
if it is not a two-track system in fact.  This may not bode well for 
affirmative action. 
IV.  ARE THERE OTHER FORCES AT WORK? 
By now, there is not a lot more the typical law school can do 
with its admissions decisions to improve the LSAT numbers used 
in the USNAWR formula.  However, that is not the only measure 
of selectivity considered by USNAWR.  The UGPA plays a role 
nearly as important in the calculations.  It gets ten percent, 
which is far more than some of the other factors, such as 
acceptance ratio.37 
Like the median LSAT of a decade ago, the median UGPA is 
 
36 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
37 See America’s Best Graduate Schools 2006: Law Methodology, supra note 13 
(explaining that selectivity is a combination of median LSAT scores weighted at 
12.5%, median UGPAs weighted at 10%, and acceptance ratios weighted at 2.5%). 
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a number that schools can do something to increase.  So far, most 
schools have not tried to maximize their UGPA.  But when they 
do, minorities could suffer large losses in access to legal 
education and non-minority students could suffer large losses in 
the diversity of their peers.  Indeed, the combination of pressure 
on the LSAT with equal pressure on the UGPA will be far more 
harmful to diversity admissions than the pressure from the 
LSAT alone.  A school of 199 students per class can maximize its 
median LSAT without paying any attention to the LSAT of 
ninety-nine students because the LSATs of the top 100 students 
define the median.  That leaves plenty of room for decisions to be 
made on factors other than the LSAT.  But when UGPA becomes 
a major factor, that flexibility disappears.  The reason for this is 
that at most schools, the applicants with high LSATs are not the 
same as the applicants with high UGPAs.  For a few students, 
both numbers are high enough to exceed both medians, but not 
for many.  Because few students can do double duty, improving 
the school’s median LSAT and median UGPA, and because a 
school needs half of the class to have high LSATs and half of the 
class to have high UGPAs, most of the class has to be picked by 
reference to one number or the other.  That leaves little room for 
selecting students by any other criteria. 
Take, for example, admissions at Indiana University School 
of Law-Bloomington for the fall of 2005.  Caution is in order here 
because projecting what admissions would have been if different 
criteria had been used is always hazardous; one never knows 
what decisions the accepted applicants would have made.  Based 
on typical acceptance rates, however, an educated guess can be 
made as to what would have happened to the class entering 
Indiana Law in 2005 if the admissions committee had attempted 
to maximize both the LSAT median and the UGPA median. 
Had the committee tried to do so, it could have achieved a 
median LSAT of 163 and a median UGPA of between 3.60 and 
3.65.  This compares to the current actual class of 229 students 
which has an LSAT median of 163 and a UGPA median of 3.46.  
The current class has eleven Asian, fourteen black, and eleven 
Hispanic students.  Had Indiana increased the UGPA median 
from 3.46 to 3.64, there would probably have been about ten 
Asians, seven blacks, and eight Hispanics.  That would be a loss 
of 10% of the Asians, 27% of the Hispanics, and 42% to 50% of 
the blacks.  Clearly those numbers are cause for alarm.  
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Although law schools are not yet maximizing their UGPA 
medians, it is hard to see them resisting the pressures put upon 
them by the method USNAWR uses to rank schools.  Resistance 
is futile and, as resistance crumbles, the makeup of the entering 
classes will change; there will be fewer minority voices. 
Some might think that the result will be tolerable on the 
theory that when higher ranked schools take fewer minority 
applicants, schools further down the USNAWR pecking order 
may be able to pick up some of those students.  Might the bad 
effects be limited to the top few schools?  The data do not provide 
a basis for optimism.  From statistical information available to 
admissions deans, I have made the following calculations: 
nationally, in 2005, of all 90,000 applicants, 10% are black, 8% 
Asian, 5% Hispanic, 2% Puerto Rican, 1.5% Mexican Chicano, 
and 1% are American Indian.  In the group of students with an 
LSAT above 159 and UGPA above 3.75, there are 27,945 
applicants, enough to fill the classes at USNAWR’s top 112 
schools.  If those 112 schools deny admission to students with 
LSATs below 160 and UGPAs below 3.75, those 112 schools will 
have, shared among them all, populations of minorities as 
follows:  Asian 10%; black 3%; Hispanic Latino 3%; Chicano 
Mexican .7%; Puerto Rican .7%; and American Indian .4%. 
These numbers show that as schools increase emphasis on 
grades and slide away from whole person review, the number of 
blacks in the top schools will move toward 3%.  Put another way, 
the coming emphasis on grades is going to work a dramatic 
reduction in the number of black students admitted to what 
USNAWR considers to be the top half of the law schools. 
V.  IS THERE ANY HOPE OF AVOIDING THE HARMS TO DIVERSITY 
ADMISSIONS? 
Concerned by the increasing and undesirable weight schools 
are placing on the LSAT, some people have suggested that 
students’ LSATs be reported in a way that would make it difficult 
for USNAWR to use the numbers in its ranking.  For example, 
the LSAC could keep all LSAT scores confidential and report 
them out to the schools on a different scale for each school.  A 
student with a 160 might be reported to school A as a twelve and 
to school B as a forty-three.  Of course, the LSAC would have to 
give schools some indication of what these scores mean, but that 
could be done in a way that would not allow USNAWR to make 
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comparisons.  The LSAC could tell school A that an eleven is 
about the same as the school’s median in the previous year and 
could tell school B that the median in the previous year was 
about forty on the new scale.  At the end of admissions season, as 
school starts, each school would know whether it did better or 
worse than the previous year’s median, but the amount of the 
improvement could not be compared across schools.  Moreover, as 
time passes, the connection to the comparable medians from the 
year 2006—or whatever is the last year under the current 
system—would become so attenuated that the data would not 
bear the weight of comparisons. 
There are at least two problems with this proposal.  First, 
students would be unable to tell where they should apply.  If the 
students were given the information that allowed them to make 
comparisons, that information would surely reach USNAWR, 
which could use it to make the same sort of comparison.  The 
prospects for admission at various schools would have to be kept 
secret from the students.  This would vastly increase the search 
burdens on the applicants.  They would have to apply to all 
schools they were interested in attending without knowing their 
chances of admission and then make their choices after finding 
out where they were accepted. 
The second problem is that USNAWR might respond by 
deleting the LSAT median from the formula and placing all of its 
weight on the UGPA.  This would have the effect of making the 
USNAWR rankings even less meaningful and more dangerous 
than they currently are.  The LSAT numbers are at least 
comparable.  Undergraduate grades are not awarded on any 
single scale.  A law school taking numerous students from an 
undergraduate institution with tough grading would look worse 
than a school that accepted equivalent caliber students but who 
had attended an undergraduate institution with substantial 
grade inflation.  Thus, USNAWR, by its own methods, is creating 
incentives for the LSAC to adopt measures that will make 
USNAWR’s rankings less valuable.  Not only would the results of 
the rankings be less useful, but the incentives created by the 
rankings would be much worse than they are now.  With time, it 
would become even more important for a high school student 
aspiring to be a lawyer to choose a college and his college 
curriculum with an eye to maximizing his UGPA. 
There is a better solution, if only USNAWR could be 
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convinced to adopt it.  USNAWR could continue to employ the 
LSAT and UGPA without causing admissions committees to 
focus entirely on those criteria if it were to use each school’s P75 
instead of the median.38  This change would reduce the effects of 
rankings on admissions practices because maximizing a class’s 
P75 on any criterion can be done with one-half as many students 
as it takes to maximize the median.  A school would need to 
admit only one-half of the class, at most, by the LSAT and UGPA 
numbers in order to maximize those numbers in the USNAWR 
formula.  That would leave one-half of the class to be admitted by 
whatever criteria and with whatever weights the law school 
decided would be best for the educational mission of the school.  
Many students would be admitted according to whether they 
would make the greatest contributions as law students and 
lawyers.39 
This change would do little harm to the utility of the 
USNAWR rankings.  Usually, a single statistic, such as the P75, 
does not give as accurate a picture of student quality as would 
two or more statistics.  But with law schools being now so focused 
on the UGPA and LSAT, what was once a description of quality 
is now a prescription for success.  If USNAWR switches to using 
just the P75 on the LSAT and UGPA, it will make almost no 
difference to the ranks of schools.  In the short run, there would 
be little difference between a ranking based on the P75 LSAT 
and a ranking based on a median calculated from the P75 and 
P25.  Using USNAWR’s 2004 data, the correlation between the 
P75 LSAT and the average of the P75 and P25 for all reported 
schools is 0.991. 
The switch from the median to the P75 would not affect the 
ranks of the schools, but it would allow schools more freedom to 
admit students with low numbers.  In the long run, some schools 
 
38 See Jeffrey E. Stake, Reducing the Impact of Rankings on Law School 
Admissions: A Proposal, JURIST, Feb. 4, 2003, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/ 
forumnew93.php. 
39 To some extent, the example above understates the benefits of changing to 
the P75s. Even before USNAWR published its rankings, many schools rejected few 
of the applicants with LSAT scores above the school’s P75. Thus, rankings based on 
the P75 LSAT would have a negligible affect on who is admitted to a given law 
school. By contrast, rankings based on the median LSAT create an incentive for 
schools to admit dozens of students in the middle of the class who would otherwise 
be rejected in favor of applicants with slightly inferior numbers but with more 
promise as lawyers. Thus, a shift to the P75 on the LSAT and UGPA could cut the 
number of students admitted primarily on the numbers by well more than half. 
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would probably make use of this new freedom, and their P25 
numbers would decrease.  Of course, the P25 for the schools 
would continue to be published, so the question is not whether 
the public would lose information.  Rather, the question is 
whether it would be somehow illegitimate for USNAWR to ignore 
that decrease and leave the schools where they are in the 
rankings.  Since the schools are taking students that they think 
will improve the school or make better lawyers than the 
applicants with higher numbers that they rejected, it is 
legitimate to consider the school to be just as strong as it would 
have been if the committee had competed with other schools 
solely on the basis of the numbers. 
The point of this proposal is not to eliminate the LSAT from 
the admissions process, nor even to dethrone it from its seat as 
the primary factor for many files.  The point is to let schools use 
the LSAT as they see fit.  With only a minuscule effect on its 
rankings, the change by USNAWR to using only the P75 on 
LSAT and UGPA could dramatically reduce the harmful long-
term effects of rankings on the admission of students that add 
diversity to American law schools. 
Another alternative that would decrease the impact of the 
rankings on admissions would be for USNAWR to change the 
ranking criteria from the LSAT and UGPA medians to the 
median of an index that combines the two.  However, because 
USNAWR needs a verifiable number for its rankings, this can 
only occur if the LSAC constructs a single index score for each 
student and reports that with the student’s other numbers.  As 
an administrative matter, this would be a trivial task.  The LSAC 
already reports an index that differs somewhat across schools.  
The new index would have to be standardized, rather than being 
tailored to each school.  But the new index need not replace the 
old index and the admissions committees could continue to use 
the old index in their decisions if they wished to do so.  Of course, 
the ABA would also have to require that each school report its 
median index score so that USNAWR would have enough 
confidence in that number to incorporate it into the rankings.  If 
both the LSAC and ABA were to endorse this approach, each law 
school could maximize its USNAWR rank by paying attention to 
this number for half of the students, while allowing other 
indicators of quality to play a more important role in the 
admission of the rest of the class. 
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The results, if this proposal were adopted, would be even 
better for law schools than the results under the P75 proposal 
above.  Under both proposals, schools would need to admit at 
most only half of the class by the UGPA and LSAT numbers.  In 
that way, the proposals are the same.  But considering only the 
half of the class that is admitted by the numbers, the index 
approach would result in a group of students more likely to be 
successful in the first year.  To the extent the LSAT and UGPA 
numbers are useful, they are more useful together than apart, so 
maximizing the index will lead each school to admit a better 
group of students than maximizing the LSAT for half of the 
group and maximizing the UGPA for the other half of the group.  
This index approach would be better for USNAWR for the same 
reason.  Because the indicators make a better predictor of 
student performance when combined, they will make a better 
indicator of law school quality when combined, to the extent that 
predictors of student performance have any utility in comparing 
law schools. 
CONCLUSION 
USNAWR has created incentives that have already changed 
the face of law school admissions, and the faces in law schools. 
These powerful incentives have not yet worked their full effect.  
Admissions have not reached an equilibrium and the incentives 
will continue to drive admissions decisions in ways that will 
further stratify law schools and further diminish the 
representation of minorities.  There is cause for alarm, but there 
is also cause for hope.  There is one change that USNAWR could 
make on its own to reduce its influence in admissions decisions.  
A simple switch to the P75s on UGPA and LSAT could cut by 
more than fifty percent the number of students that each school 
would feel compelled to admit by those numbers.  The other 
change would be even more beneficial, but would require action 
by additional organizational players.  If the LSAC were to create 
a single index made up of the LSAT and UGPA for each student 
and report that number to the law schools, and the ABA were to 
collect index medians from the schools, and USNAWR were to 
employ those medians instead of the separate medians on LSAT 
and UGPA, the students admitted primarily on the numbers 
would be a better group and half of the class could be admitted 
on other indicators of quality in the file.  Either proposal would 
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be vastly more accommodating to minority admissions than the 
current method used by USNAWR.  Either reform would free 
schools to admit many students of greater promise than those 
who are admitted today. 
 
